I thought it would be an interesting exercise to try to conceive an "ideal" normative framework for a political system (according to my perspective). This post is my initial start on this project. It's maybe 1/8 of the way done, although I couldn't say for sure until I finish. There's a lot of things to clean up and even more to add. I'd just like to invite criticism every step along the way.
1 Within the normative framework of a capitalist state, discrepancies between matters of value occur in either of two sorts of things:
(1) The role and function of the state
(2) The "balancing acts" between established values
1.1 Fundamentally, the function of the state is to promote the welfare and well-being of its citizens. (This paradigm may, however, prove insufficient for interaction between states, but this will be addressed later.)
1.11 This is self-evident. A state that does not promote welfare (neither actively nor passively) is not only undesirable but superfluous.
1.12 All values that are to be reflected in the state are done so under the umbrella of welfare. Among these are liberty, order, justice, health, equality, democracy, etc.
1.13 This appears true regardless of one's political leaning; any disagreement that is bound to arise on this matter lies in the means and extent that the state should pursue to promote these, and in an inherently imprecise "balancing act" between the tenets of welfare (e.g. when in a certain conflict, liberty takes precedence over order).
1.131 The assigning of precedence between tenets need not be hierarchical.
2 In addition, the state may be seen as a formal extension of culture and society.
2.1 This poses the question of whether the social and political spheres should be separate or unified.
2.12 The social sphere can exist and function without becoming entwined in the political sphere.
2.121 Social standards can be upheld without the recourse of law, i.e. informally. (This practice is formally justified provided that the means utilized does not conflict with existing law.)
2.122 If an informal standard requires the recourse of law in order to be upheld, it must be synonymous with the formal. If this is not the case the formal standard would take precedence over the informal.
2.13 The political sphere cannot exist and function without becoming entwined in the social sphere.
2.131 The political sphere exists to regulate the social sphere.
2.132 The actors that comprise the political sphere are not independent of the social sphere.
2.2 The social sphere is intrinsically heterogeneous.
2.21 Therewith modes of ethics in the social sphere will inevitably clash.
2.211 Ethics necessarily requires presupposition (the prescription of value).
2.212 This presupposition is either worldly (viz. sensory-psychological, e.g. preference utilitarianism) or non-worldly (i.e. theological).
2.22 The formal dilemma lies in constructing a homogenous framework that allows for heterogeneity, while at the same time minimizing conflict within the formal domain.
2.3 Therefore, a compromise may be necessary, i.e. limiting factors, if heterogeneity is to be permitted.
2.31 Any compromise would require an arbiter, a "third" party. This arbiter may be a combination of objective sciences (i.e. science and philosophy in a narrow sense).
2.32 Science and philosophy can express objective validity. Social custom can only express objective validity if confirmed by science and philosophy.
2.33 By 'objective', I mean practical by virtue of worldly observation.
2.4 Social customs that lack objective validity should not be expressed formally, i.e. through law.
2.41 Non-worldly, i.e. noumenal, justifications are incapable of expressing objective validity. (Things that are outside of the world cannot be proven by means of the world.)
2.42 Justifications expressing objective validity apply to all sects of the social sphere.
2.421 Objectivity supplants dogmatism when in conflict. (That which is objective exists in the world and is proven by means of the world) [Also: natural law intrinsically takes precedence over human law.] In this case, objectivity--that which must be proven by means of the world--should be distinguished from dogmatism--that which must be proven by means of social custom or factors outside of the world.
2.422 If cultural heterogeneity is not to be formally subdued, the formal framework should not side with any cultural sect lest the state becomes a formal extension of that sect.
2.43 Therefore, social customs with non-worldly justification should not be expressed formally unless they also possess objective justification, and then only on the merit of the latter. Likewise, social customs that do not express objective validity should not be formally restricted unless they conflict with existing law.
2.431 The popular demand for formally expressed dogmatism does not itself constitute objective validity.
2.6 Therefore, the state (which is formal) should only function as an extension of culture insofar as it expresses the objective views of the (cultural) body that comprises it. Culture proper is to be expressed informally; it is the duty of the state to facilitate that expression within its formal framework.
2.7 The expression of objective validity is not wholly sufficient in determining the grounds for law--the baseline moral foundations are incapable of having objective determinacy.
2.71 These axiological "gaps" are sated by presupposition. The necessary moral foundations are found in the presupposition of the purpose of the state, i.e. welfare of the body it governs.
2.8 The formal ethics of a state that allows for cultural heterogeneity must appeal to either relativism or universality, or both.
2.81 Relativism is permitted through the lack of formal interference on informal practices. This is established passively, i.e. through laws granting negative liberties.
2.82 At the same time, no legal morality would be established under strict passivity. (A strictly relativistic ethical system ceases to be ethical.) Therefore, some code of universality is required on the part of the state--this is unavoidable.
3 Laws are formal propositions that collectively regulate the actions of the state and its citizens for a collective benefit.
3.1 Laws are moral in nature.
3.11 Just as the function of the state is to establish and promote welfare, so too is the function of law.
3.12 There is no such thing as a law that altogether lacks any form of moral objective. (Or, more accurately, laws that altogether lack a moral objective are undesirable and unnecessary.)
3.121 "Morally neutral" laws are components of formal schemata which collectively form cohesive, morally or objectively oriented laws.
3.122 A law can be comprised of separate components or procedural mandates which are themselves considered laws. These components, when viewed in a larger context, constitute a larger law that is not morally neutral.
3.1221 Contract law is no exception. The fields required of formal contracts are adopted for practical and moral reasons.
3.123 The descending hierarchy of law's formulation could be seen as moral -> moral application -> procedure.
3.1231 (e.g. Murder is immoral -> murder is therefore illegal -> recourse in the case of murder follows from these formal procedural requirements and leads to this formal procedural persecution.)
3.124 These sub-moral, "procedural" laws are inherently more corrigible than morals and moral applications.
3.2 The foremost moral-law would establish the system of law, the framework in which law operates.
To be continued...
1 Within the normative framework of a capitalist state, discrepancies between matters of value occur in either of two sorts of things:
(1) The role and function of the state
(2) The "balancing acts" between established values
1.1 Fundamentally, the function of the state is to promote the welfare and well-being of its citizens. (This paradigm may, however, prove insufficient for interaction between states, but this will be addressed later.)
1.11 This is self-evident. A state that does not promote welfare (neither actively nor passively) is not only undesirable but superfluous.
1.12 All values that are to be reflected in the state are done so under the umbrella of welfare. Among these are liberty, order, justice, health, equality, democracy, etc.
1.13 This appears true regardless of one's political leaning; any disagreement that is bound to arise on this matter lies in the means and extent that the state should pursue to promote these, and in an inherently imprecise "balancing act" between the tenets of welfare (e.g. when in a certain conflict, liberty takes precedence over order).
1.131 The assigning of precedence between tenets need not be hierarchical.
2 In addition, the state may be seen as a formal extension of culture and society.
2.1 This poses the question of whether the social and political spheres should be separate or unified.
2.12 The social sphere can exist and function without becoming entwined in the political sphere.
2.121 Social standards can be upheld without the recourse of law, i.e. informally. (This practice is formally justified provided that the means utilized does not conflict with existing law.)
2.122 If an informal standard requires the recourse of law in order to be upheld, it must be synonymous with the formal. If this is not the case the formal standard would take precedence over the informal.
2.13 The political sphere cannot exist and function without becoming entwined in the social sphere.
2.131 The political sphere exists to regulate the social sphere.
2.132 The actors that comprise the political sphere are not independent of the social sphere.
2.2 The social sphere is intrinsically heterogeneous.
2.21 Therewith modes of ethics in the social sphere will inevitably clash.
2.211 Ethics necessarily requires presupposition (the prescription of value).
2.212 This presupposition is either worldly (viz. sensory-psychological, e.g. preference utilitarianism) or non-worldly (i.e. theological).
2.22 The formal dilemma lies in constructing a homogenous framework that allows for heterogeneity, while at the same time minimizing conflict within the formal domain.
2.3 Therefore, a compromise may be necessary, i.e. limiting factors, if heterogeneity is to be permitted.
2.31 Any compromise would require an arbiter, a "third" party. This arbiter may be a combination of objective sciences (i.e. science and philosophy in a narrow sense).
2.32 Science and philosophy can express objective validity. Social custom can only express objective validity if confirmed by science and philosophy.
2.33 By 'objective', I mean practical by virtue of worldly observation.
2.4 Social customs that lack objective validity should not be expressed formally, i.e. through law.
2.41 Non-worldly, i.e. noumenal, justifications are incapable of expressing objective validity. (Things that are outside of the world cannot be proven by means of the world.)
2.42 Justifications expressing objective validity apply to all sects of the social sphere.
2.421 Objectivity supplants dogmatism when in conflict. (That which is objective exists in the world and is proven by means of the world) [Also: natural law intrinsically takes precedence over human law.] In this case, objectivity--that which must be proven by means of the world--should be distinguished from dogmatism--that which must be proven by means of social custom or factors outside of the world.
2.422 If cultural heterogeneity is not to be formally subdued, the formal framework should not side with any cultural sect lest the state becomes a formal extension of that sect.
2.43 Therefore, social customs with non-worldly justification should not be expressed formally unless they also possess objective justification, and then only on the merit of the latter. Likewise, social customs that do not express objective validity should not be formally restricted unless they conflict with existing law.
2.431 The popular demand for formally expressed dogmatism does not itself constitute objective validity.
2.6 Therefore, the state (which is formal) should only function as an extension of culture insofar as it expresses the objective views of the (cultural) body that comprises it. Culture proper is to be expressed informally; it is the duty of the state to facilitate that expression within its formal framework.
2.7 The expression of objective validity is not wholly sufficient in determining the grounds for law--the baseline moral foundations are incapable of having objective determinacy.
2.71 These axiological "gaps" are sated by presupposition. The necessary moral foundations are found in the presupposition of the purpose of the state, i.e. welfare of the body it governs.
2.8 The formal ethics of a state that allows for cultural heterogeneity must appeal to either relativism or universality, or both.
2.81 Relativism is permitted through the lack of formal interference on informal practices. This is established passively, i.e. through laws granting negative liberties.
2.82 At the same time, no legal morality would be established under strict passivity. (A strictly relativistic ethical system ceases to be ethical.) Therefore, some code of universality is required on the part of the state--this is unavoidable.
3 Laws are formal propositions that collectively regulate the actions of the state and its citizens for a collective benefit.
3.1 Laws are moral in nature.
3.11 Just as the function of the state is to establish and promote welfare, so too is the function of law.
3.12 There is no such thing as a law that altogether lacks any form of moral objective. (Or, more accurately, laws that altogether lack a moral objective are undesirable and unnecessary.)
3.121 "Morally neutral" laws are components of formal schemata which collectively form cohesive, morally or objectively oriented laws.
3.122 A law can be comprised of separate components or procedural mandates which are themselves considered laws. These components, when viewed in a larger context, constitute a larger law that is not morally neutral.
3.1221 Contract law is no exception. The fields required of formal contracts are adopted for practical and moral reasons.
3.123 The descending hierarchy of law's formulation could be seen as moral -> moral application -> procedure.
3.1231 (e.g. Murder is immoral -> murder is therefore illegal -> recourse in the case of murder follows from these formal procedural requirements and leads to this formal procedural persecution.)
3.124 These sub-moral, "procedural" laws are inherently more corrigible than morals and moral applications.
3.2 The foremost moral-law would establish the system of law, the framework in which law operates.
To be continued...
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