I believe that our society’s attention to detail is wrongheaded.
By this, I mean many things. I mean that we are more concerned about the perception of progress than the reality of progress. I mean that we are more alarmed by sexuality than by violence, depravity, and suffering. I mean that, as George Carlin once said, we are more offended by four letter words than by the intentions behind them. I mean that we are more fixated on rationing sodium and ketchup packets in the school cafeteria than developing the habits that underlie healthy eating. I mean that we are more focused on raising test scores than with eliminating poverty. I mean that we are more adamant about adequately funding prisons than adequately funding schools. I mean that we are more occupied with carefully selected statistics than with genuine, abundant signs of improvement or atrophy. I mean that we are more interested in SparkNotes summaries than with the raw, experiential meaning. I mean that we are more alarmed about microscopic nudity in Where’s Waldo than with naked bigotry in popular culture. I mean that we are more concerned, that is, with perception than we are with substance.
There is an inappropriate word that we use to describe this trend. A philosopher by the name of Harry G. Frankfurt writes about it in his insightful, book-long essay, “On Bullshit.” He writes:
One of the most salient features of our culture is there is so much bullsh**. Everyone knows this. Each of us contributes his share. [… but it] is more polite, as well as less intense, to say “Humbug!” than to say “bullsh**!”
However, Dr. Frankfurt’s conclusions and mine differ. He concludes that “[o]ur natures are, indeed, elusively insubstantial—notoriously less stable and less inherent than the natures of other things. And insofar as this is the case,” he says, “sincerity itself is bullsh**.”
This statement of his is complete humbug—err, bullsh**. In my mind, another philosopher by the name of David Hume resolved this dispute ages ago. Hume’s law tells us that what is does not dictate what ought to be. We might ask, if our politics are dysfunctional, if our society is dysfunctional, if our schools are dysfunctional—is that due their nature? Due to our nature? Are we ourselves dysfunctional?
Bullsh**.
I believe we should always strive to make things better, and not merely acquiesce to their "nature." I believe that words matter, but so does substance. And I sincerely and substantively believe in substance.
Showing posts with label best of blog. Show all posts
Showing posts with label best of blog. Show all posts
Wednesday, July 1, 2015
This I Believe: There is so much bullsh**.
I wrote this "This I Believe" essay as a sample for my students a few years ago. Here it is decensored:
Labels:
best of blog,
education,
essay,
politics,
rants
Wednesday, November 27, 2013
Metamorphosis
There's a certain point in life where many people make the profound transition from ignorant young person to misinformed adult. I think this article and the comments below it demonstrate that.
1. Common Core: The Obamacare of Education

1. Common Core: The Obamacare of Education
Labels:
angst,
aphorisms,
best of blog,
education
Sunday, December 4, 2011
Tuesday, November 15, 2011
Two concerns for critical thinking
- "emotionally potent oversimplifications"
- an "antinomian impulse": the tendency to draw fictitious dichotomies and antagonisms
Monday, May 2, 2011
Victory... therefore pornography.
A friend of mine just posted this on facebook, speculating that Bin Laden's recent death may have had a similar effect:
Title: Pornography-seeking behaviors following midterm political elections in the United States: A replication of the challenge hypothesis
Authors: Patrick and Charlotte Markey
Published in: Computers in Human Behavior
Volume 27 Issue 3, May, 2011
Abstract: The current study examined a prediction derived from the challenge hypothesis; individuals who viciously win a competition of rank order will seek out pornography relatively more often than individuals who viciously lose a competition. By examining Google keyword searches during the 2006 and 2010 midterm elections in the United States, the relative popularity of various pornography keyword searches was computed for each state and the District of Columbia the week after each midterm election. Consistent with previous research examining presidential elections and the challenge hypothesis, individuals located in traditionally Republican states tended to search for pornography keywords relatively more often after the 2010 midterm election (a Republican victory) than after the 2006 midterm election (a Democratic victory). Conversely, individuals located in traditionally Democratic states tended to search for pornography relatively less often following the 2010 midterm election than they did following the 2006 midterm election.
Labels:
best of blog,
news,
silliness,
somewhat interesting
Sunday, February 20, 2011
a student's thoughts on lucille clifton
this poem is stupid. it don't
rhyme or nothin'.
capital letters're all gone.
i don't get what it's about
when it's all talkin'
'bout some conversation
with stuff that don't
make no sense.
what's it even about?
why does anyone read it?
i mean,
you keep sayin' there's
somethin' in there, but
i be diggin' deep in the cookie jar
and it seems all empty to me.
why do you read it?
wha' does that say about you?
rhyme or nothin'.
capital letters're all gone.
i don't get what it's about
when it's all talkin'
'bout some conversation
with stuff that don't
make no sense.
what's it even about?
why does anyone read it?
i mean,
you keep sayin' there's
somethin' in there, but
i be diggin' deep in the cookie jar
and it seems all empty to me.
why do you read it?
wha' does that say about you?
Sunday, January 16, 2011
Comments on the "video games as art" debate
Image source: Grim Fandango (1998)
IN MANY WAYS, the word art is polyphonous. It has a large number of disparate meanings that we tend to invoke indiscriminately each time we use the term. It's not surprising, then, that when someone argues that so-and-such is not art, there is some kind of backlash, and the case of video games is no exception. Film critic Roger Ebert has kindled this debate over the years by arguing on various occasions that video games are an inherently inferior medium. “No one in or out of the field," he says in one interview, “has ever been able to cite a game worthy of comparison with the great dramatists, poets, filmmakers, novelists, and composers. That a game can aspire to artistic importance as a visual experience, I accept. But for most gamers, video games represent a loss of those precious hours we have available to make ourselves more cultured, civilized, and empathetic.”
These and other statements of his have brought on a number counter-arguments—some good, some bad—from game critics, designers, players, and people with too much time on their hands. Many of them pointed to the artwork, music, and sounds in games while others identified storytelling techniques that are unique to the medium; some even gave offered examples which are personal favorites of mine like Shadow of the Colossus. But every refutation I've read seems to miss the point, as I see it, in one way or another.
Recently, Ebert retracted his comments, graciously agreeing with numerous accusations that he didn't know much about video games in the first place and that he was wrong deny outright the artistic possibilities of a medium still in its infancy. Despite this, I find myself―as someone fairly knowledgeable about games―mostly agreeing with his earlier arguments. In truth, it's rare that any game comes anywhere near the mantle of “high art,” as haughty a notion as that is. But it's also rare that games approach the sorts of art that I consider to be the most valuable: art that opens up new conversations, that brings new light to the old and familiar, that has a profound impact on how we experience and make sense of the world. Of course, this sort of art is in short supply in other media as well (and, of course, it's partly because of its scarcity that it's so treasured). Yes, video games have no “Moonlight Sonata” (although the song appears in some of them), no Ulysses, no Ernest Goes to Jail. But, just as there are countless uninspired first-person shooters, there are countless uninspired mystery novels, love songs, and unexceptional paintings. Where I agree with Roger Ebert is with his argument and not with his irreverent use of the word art: that the core experience in video games, as a medium, is not an intuitive vehicle for art as he and I have defined it.
In their early days, video games were thought of mainly as children's playthings. Grand Theft Auto and other titles have helped to change that perception over time, but the medium hasn't quite outgrown it. And despite the improved graphics and mature content, the center of today's gaming experience is still a kind of toy-driven exhilaration. Bioshock has some Ayn Rand inspired story elements, but they are ultimately a background for shooting things. Myst, Silent Hill 2, Shadow of the Colossus, and Braid are all excellent examples of subtle, evocative storytelling, but they are ultimately about exploration and puzzle solving. In the same ways that Chess is about warfare and Monopoly is about capitalism, their stories are lost in the “action,” so to speak―at best a host to their interactive elements. As Doom creator John Carmack once said, “Story in a game is like story in a porn movie. It’s expected to be there, but it’s not that important.”
As Ebert has noted, there is a basic conflict of purpose between the conventional experiences of video games and the works of other established mediums. Games are usually about overcoming obstacles or playing within the parameters of the game world, while novels and movies are more concerned with characters and storytelling. This is not to say that no video games have taken storytelling seriously. Interactive fiction (text adventures) of the '80s and graphic adventure games and interactive movies of the '90s made story the central focus and reduced game play to a series of decisions to advance particular narratives, with mixed results. The problem with these has generally been that player decisions are mostly superfluous. One path leads to the end, the rest to impasses or “Game Over” screens. Some games have multiple endings, but they are usually analogous to a different final paragraph at the end of a novel. All told, very few game story lines necessitate meaningful player decisions. Most are essentially movies broken up by puzzles, hazards, and errands. Even ambitious titles like Heavy Rain, which offer up more complex choices and consequences, are still far from being considered exemplars of an art form on par with film and literature.
As eloquently or poorly as some stories are told, high-quality stories in video games are extremely hard to come by. I suppose Grim Fandango is a decent love story; Rez is an interesting experiment with A.I. in existential crisis; and Andrew Plotkin's Shade has its flaws but could not be told in any other way. I'm not suggesting by any stretch that my tastes are universal, but anyone familiar with video games up to this point has to admit that there is a very limited number of games out there which competently—much less masterfully—explore contemporary issues or manage to impart a lasting emotional impression. Simply put, most video games do not focus on these things. They have amusing mechanics with challenges to overcome, and they generally don't need the social commentary and emotional resonance to be successful as games. But in so doing they cannot be so easily classified as art (as I've been using the word).
However, I may be getting ahead of myself in suggesting that good stories are the only ways to get at these qualities. Some exceptional games are able to achieve these through the game mechanics themselves. fl0w, for example, presents a stylized glimpse into the experiences of tiny organisms, and I can't help but think that Katamari Damacy makes some kind of commentary on consumerism and all of the objects and clutter in our lives. As always, the line between art and not-art is tenuous and ultimately subjective, but I still believe that art which breeds empathy, emotion, and understanding is perhaps harder to come by for games than for novels and movies—due, in large part, to the medium itself rather than shortcomings in terms of what has been offered so far.
All things said, though, my favorite game to this day is still probably Super Mario Bros. 3. It may not engender empathy or count as "art" based on what I've said, but it's damned fun.

Update:
Journey is probably for the best argument I've seen yet for games as art. Absolutely incredible.
Labels:
aesthetics,
art,
best of blog,
editorial,
literature,
video games
Saturday, May 15, 2010
Neopragmatist Poetics
Here is a recent essay that more or less sums up my current views on philosophy. I plan to do some heavy revising down the road, but I think it's still worth reading as is.
1. Redescribing Shelley's Defense of Poetry: Rorty, Rich, and the Making of a Neopragmatist Poetics
2. The Plaque Conspiracy with Continual Reference to Derrida (a humorous, misleading cover sheet and preface originally attached to the above essay)
1. Redescribing Shelley's Defense of Poetry: Rorty, Rich, and the Making of a Neopragmatist Poetics
2. The Plaque Conspiracy with Continual Reference to Derrida (a humorous, misleading cover sheet and preface originally attached to the above essay)
Labels:
art,
best of blog,
editorial,
essay,
Freire,
language,
literature,
philosophy,
poetry,
politics,
Rorty,
silliness,
Wittgenstein
Wednesday, April 1, 2009
House of Leaves of Grass
According to a certain publisher's press release, author Walt Z. Danmanewski has a new work that is set to hit the shelves next week.
Here's an exclusive preview of one of its pages, courtesy of the publisher (click to view it at a higher resolution):

4/23 update:
Suggested reading:
1. House of Pancakes
Here's an exclusive preview of one of its pages, courtesy of the publisher (click to view it at a higher resolution):

4/23 update:
Suggested reading:
1. House of Pancakes
Labels:
april 1,
best of blog,
literature,
news,
silliness
Tuesday, December 23, 2008
The problem with freshmen
They'd rather...

The graph supposedly cites data from:
Pryor, J. H., Hurtado, S., Saenz, V. B., Lindholm, J. A., Korn, W. S., & Mahoney, K. M. (2005). The American freshman: National norms for fall 2005. Los Angeles: Higher Education Research Institute, UCLA.

The graph supposedly cites data from:
Pryor, J. H., Hurtado, S., Saenz, V. B., Lindholm, J. A., Korn, W. S., & Mahoney, K. M. (2005). The American freshman: National norms for fall 2005. Los Angeles: Higher Education Research Institute, UCLA.
Labels:
best of blog,
education,
graphs,
happiness,
morals,
somewhat interesting
Friday, April 11, 2008
This morning
I woke up this morning not wanting to get out of bed. I had planned to get up early and study for a geography test (which I could care less about), but apparently it didn't work out. When I finally did get up, I was still feeling groggy and tired. Then, after a quick breakfast, I went to my car to drive to the school at which I tutor. I hadn't driven for about a week, and when I got inside I noticed a few things were different. The seatbelt was braided through the steering wheel, my rear-view mirror was turned side-ways, and I think some of my CDs were rearranged in the overhead organizer. (Nothing was stolen, though.) All of Lawrence went nuts on Monday night because our basketball team won the NCAA tournament. There wasn't very much serious damage that I heard of from this, but I think what happened is that someone got into my car that night and had fun with it. It was definitely unexpected but it livened up my day.
Then tutoring.. and Captain Underpants...
And I just took my geography test. When I rode back on my bike I was going against the wind on third gear. A gust came and actually stopped me, pushed me back two feet or so, and nearly tore my glasses from my face. The wind here is just obnoxious right now. (Why doesn't Lawrence have wind turbines?) And yeah.. so now I'm eating a burrito. Awesome story, yes?
Then tutoring.. and Captain Underpants...
And I just took my geography test. When I rode back on my bike I was going against the wind on third gear. A gust came and actually stopped me, pushed me back two feet or so, and nearly tore my glasses from my face. The wind here is just obnoxious right now. (Why doesn't Lawrence have wind turbines?) And yeah.. so now I'm eating a burrito. Awesome story, yes?
Monday, February 18, 2008
Panda pornography unsuccessful
.jpg)
. . .
Their encounter is filmed by one of the keepers. And scientists at the Chengdu Research Base for Giant Panda Breeding now play this mating tape to other pandas in the hope that it will encourage them to do the same.
"Here you can see the female is very co-operative," says reproduction specialist Hou Rong - who is known here as the Goddess of Fertility. She watches the video closely.
The two pandas writhe about for a bit longer. Then they untangle. It may be best to stop male pandas from watching what comes next.
"The female is not co-operative," says Dr Hou laconically.
That is an understatement.
The tape shows the female, Qing Qing, attacking the male, Ha Lei. He runs off to the corner, looking sheepish.
. . .
Female pandas are only interested in reproducing for two or three days a year. For males it is the same.
Luckily for the survival of the panda species, these days of interest happen to coincide.
Scientists here have to make the most of this brief mating season. There are only around 2,000 pandas left in the world - including about 250 in captivity.
So the trick for everyone here at the Chengdu reserve is to get their pandas together on the right days, and then nudge them along a bit by playing them the video of Qing Qing and Ha Lei.
No one here can remember who came up with the idea - it was possibly a behaviour specialist from abroad, they say.
And there is one problem - no one is sure whether or not the mating tapes make any difference.
"We don't know if its useful for pandas or not," says Dr Hou. "Some pandas are interested. Others are not interested. They prefer to eat or rest - and not pay attention to the video."
Headache?
We get together a small monitor and some loudspeakers, put some plastic bags onto our shoes and head into a small enclosure.
One panda lies on its back among piles of bamboo leaves. Another is asleep. It does not look like they have mating on their minds.
We set up a small TV screen in front of a seven-year-old female panda called Shu Qing. She is busy crunching her way through an apple.
We play her the tape of Qing Qing and Ha Lei. Shu Qing shows no interest. She is much more concerned about finishing her apple.
After a couple of minutes she glances over at the TV monitor. Then she seems lost in thought. She vaguely waves a paw, but nothing more.
So the video does not appear to work. Perhaps Shu Qing has a headache, or perhaps she just prefers apples to adult videos.
So the reserve lets us play the video to the pandas ourselves.
1. Sex videos fail to engage pandas

Saturday, November 17, 2007
Masterpieces of Modern Art







Labels:
aesthetics,
art,
best of blog,
silliness,
WTF?
Saturday, September 1, 2007
World population growth through history
Sadly, this is the best graph I could find on Google. It does its job though. (Click to view it in full-size.)

It's crazy to me that just over 200 years ago someone could say, "Wow, there are over a billion people! Isn't that ridiculous?—so, so many of us, more than there's ever been." And at the end of this century there may be as many as eight or twelve times that number.

It's crazy to me that just over 200 years ago someone could say, "Wow, there are over a billion people! Isn't that ridiculous?—so, so many of us, more than there's ever been." And at the end of this century there may be as many as eight or twelve times that number.
Labels:
best of blog,
environment,
food history,
graphs,
overpopulation
Wednesday, July 25, 2007
Philosophy as such
[Note: This entire post would be struck through (like this) if I didn't want it to remain readable. I now see some flaws, but I still think the overall argument is interesting enough that it should be preserved. So, here it is:]
Thesis 1: Without language there is no occasion for philosophical thought.
1a. Experience contains no paradoxes and no contradictions. These can only occur between statements and propositions—that is, in words. (The word 'contradiction' does well to emphasize my point: contra dicere would roughly translate as "to say against.") The quality of being "true" or "false," likewise, can only apply to propositions.
1b. It is possible to perceive problems in a variety of fields without a recourse to language.2 You may be able to express or describe these problems in terms of language, but the language itself is not necessary in order to recognize and address them. In philosophy's case, however, language is the source of its problems and inquiries, and without language there are none.
1c. There's no such thing as a "philosophical problem" simply because there are no solutions to be found. All that is available is a dissolution of the problem through a more thorough understanding of what has gone awry.3
1d. The subject of a great deal of traditional philosophy is where concepts intersect with actuality. Actuality is a posteriori (phenomena); philosophy's treatment of it is a priori (in concepts, statements; descriptions and prescriptions).
1e. The philosopher has two tools at his or her disposal: language and logic. The methods and results of logic are self-evident, but what language is conveying often isn't, e.g. "All physical objects are extended," "This sentence is false."
1f. Language is essentially a means of description, prescription, or expression5. Individual words and concepts are components of a language-game aimed at any of these. (With regard to inferences, language is not a means of giving substance to or in some way constituting them, but only describing/expressing them.)
1g. Description presents no possibility of transcendence. (Creating a picture6 of something will not grant a greater insight into how it appears than what can already be seen.)
1h. Language can only describe experience through abstraction. It's not as though nouns are proxies for actual objects simply because the very concept of an "object" is itself an abstraction. The question of whether Theseus's ship will endure after exchanging all of its planks originated under ignorance of this process.
1i. It follows that a great many concepts are not referents to any particular aspect of reality. Some would try to transcend it or exist independently of it, but in doing so there is no possibility for mutual intelligibility or mutual understanding of what is meant beyond the intangible-abstract (as in, e.g., soul, Geist, the eternal, the Good). And while the construction of concepts through various component-abstractions is mutually intelligible (for instance, intuiting a centaur through the union of certain features of a horse and certain features of a human), it carries with it no necessity or non-conceptual "reality".
Thesis 2: "Knowledge" and metaphysics are incompatible.
2a. Metaphysics is absolute non-sense. (See 1g, 1i.)
2b. Epistemically, the only incorrigible knowledge of "reality 7" that we have is of the here-and-now (i.e. immediate sense data, qualia).
2c. The ontological distinction between subject (-ivity) and object (-ivity) is untenable. The subject is at once an object, and the object is only experienced by means of the subject... the subject is at once itself and a feature of the world. It experiences the world by means of the world itself. (See the quote following 1f.)
2d. The mind-body distinction is purely the product of a language-game. It attempts, I suppose, to distinguish thinking from feeling, and internal states (i.e. subjectivity) from external states (objective reality), but the former is really a distinction between language and experience, and the latter is really between a subject's sense-experience and a mutual consensus (between persons) on sense-experience. Again, in metaphysical terms the mind/body distinction has no foundation—for we have no knowledge of this mutual consensus.
2e. Whatever the findings of the philosophy of mind, they will be of no practical or functional significance. There can be no a priori mutual consensus regarding internal states simply because there is no object or observable process.
Thesis 3: Certainty in the domain of philosophy is only possible insofar as it has no pertinence to the world.
3a. "Objectivity" in the domain of any given topic stands for little more than the possibility for universal agreement. This can only be achieved in a priori terms through prescription, and in a posteriori terms through the (accurate, scientific) description of the world. (The a priori sort can possess apodictic "objectivity", e.g. 1+1=2; the problem of induction prevents this in a posteriori cases.)
3b. Knowledge in practical terms (e.g. that there is gravity) isn't absolute, but it doesn't need to be in order to be of use. Mutual consensus is only beneficial insofar as it suits our practical interests. In this regard, we have no need for universal commensuration.
3c. It follows from philosophy's dependence on language that the only certainty it can proffer lies in matters that either have no pertinence to the world or that describe what is already known.
3d. Logic can inform us that, under certain rules and given certain rule-following components, one proposition will follow from another, but these rules cannot be constituted a priori without losing relevance to the world. Practical inquiries (ethics, social/political philosophy), conversely, can have relevance to the pre-existing ways we perceive and describe, but they are independent of certainty simply because philosophy is incapable of constructing a first principle that has a direct link to the world [as something independent of what is described].
3e. In this sense philosophy cannot say anything constructive. The above points illustrate the impossibility of system-building while maintaining relevance.
3f. Bertrand Russell once said:
Instead of having faith that our descriptions will transpose the world... instead of viewing "knowledge" as an ultimatum rather than a means to various ends, we should see philosophy for what it really is: the obvious or the dogmatic.
3g. Philosophy without certainty can, however, be productive in at least two areas: heuristics and hermeneutics. Heuristics embodies wisdom in the most conventional sense and hermeneutics represents an effort to deconstruct and interpret.
To this end, it is my hope that Russell's conception of philosophy is replaced by Wittgenstein's:
1 All too often works in philosophy are strictly reactionary, and interdependent on other works for their (often unstated) presuppositions. Frequently, too, they're written in such esoteric terms that their significance to the world is limited to the few that can actually understand them. I've made an effort to avoid partaking in either tradition.
What follows is not intended to provide an absolute answer to philosophy as a study, but rather an attempt to frame it in such a way that it is robbed of its incongruities. It is an attempt at stating my current views to the best of my ability, and, in my mind, is free of controversy.
2 I've had some difficulty in finding an appropriate example to illustrate this. Let's suppose you are fixing something, thinking of ways to improve it, or identifying problems inherent in it. While language may assist you (as a heuristic device for instance), it is not necessary for you to carry on.
The idea that I'm trying to get across is that, when doing philosophy, language is not only removed from experience, but from other appropriate sources of reference (as in history, literature, mathematics). At this level the subject of inquiry becomes dubious.
3 This is a harsh way of saying that philosophical problems are completely artificial constructions. There may still be a "problem" so-to-speak, but it has no relevance to the world.
4 I admit that this quotation doesn't quite support my point, but I do feel it serves a purpose. As with all of the quotes, I am not trying to provide any interpretation of Wittgenstein, but rather show certain eloquent statements of his that are tied to my disposition.
5 This point is somewhat clumsy. Language can do a great variety of things, and it is in my opinion that these three encompass them, albeit if somewhat obscurely. The point is not to define three simple categories that neatly envelope all of its functions, but to give a basic idea of those functions.
6 A "picture" may tell you more about your frame of reference, but nothing further about what you are depicting.
7 The concept of "reality" is a troublesome. In practice, it describes a mutually perceived world (see 3a), but the idea that there is such a thing as "valid" and "invalid" experience doesn't make sense. Experiences are as they are, and short of some recourse to a higher being, we cannot say that one experience (experienced subjectively) is faulty while another is true.
Also, my use of the word "knowledge" shifts from meaning something like "absolute knowledge" to "corrigible" knowledge (e.g. experiences, available information, etc.) depending on the context of how it is used.
"The real discovery is the one which enables me to stop doing philosophy when I want to. The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself into question.". . .
Thesis 1: Without language there is no occasion for philosophical thought.
1a. Experience contains no paradoxes and no contradictions. These can only occur between statements and propositions—that is, in words. (The word 'contradiction' does well to emphasize my point: contra dicere would roughly translate as "to say against.") The quality of being "true" or "false," likewise, can only apply to propositions.
"The world is all that is the case."
"The logic of the world is prior to all truth and falsehood."
1b. It is possible to perceive problems in a variety of fields without a recourse to language.2 You may be able to express or describe these problems in terms of language, but the language itself is not necessary in order to recognize and address them. In philosophy's case, however, language is the source of its problems and inquiries, and without language there are none.
"For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday."
"Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language."
"People say again and again that philosophy doesn't really progress, that we are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. But the people who say this don't understand why it has to be so. It is because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions."
1c. There's no such thing as a "philosophical problem" simply because there are no solutions to be found. All that is available is a dissolution of the problem through a more thorough understanding of what has gone awry.3
1d. The subject of a great deal of traditional philosophy is where concepts intersect with actuality. Actuality is a posteriori (phenomena); philosophy's treatment of it is a priori (in concepts, statements; descriptions and prescriptions).
"It follows from this separation of form and content that logic tells us nothing about the actual world."4
1e. The philosopher has two tools at his or her disposal: language and logic. The methods and results of logic are self-evident, but what language is conveying often isn't, e.g. "All physical objects are extended," "This sentence is false."
"Logic takes care of itself, all we have to do is to look and see how it does it."
1f. Language is essentially a means of description, prescription, or expression5. Individual words and concepts are components of a language-game aimed at any of these. (With regard to inferences, language is not a means of giving substance to or in some way constituting them, but only describing/expressing them.)
"For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined as thus: the meaning of a word is its use in language."
1g. Description presents no possibility of transcendence. (Creating a picture6 of something will not grant a greater insight into how it appears than what can already be seen.)
1h. Language can only describe experience through abstraction. It's not as though nouns are proxies for actual objects simply because the very concept of an "object" is itself an abstraction. The question of whether Theseus's ship will endure after exchanging all of its planks originated under ignorance of this process.
1i. It follows that a great many concepts are not referents to any particular aspect of reality. Some would try to transcend it or exist independently of it, but in doing so there is no possibility for mutual intelligibility or mutual understanding of what is meant beyond the intangible-abstract (as in, e.g., soul, Geist, the eternal, the Good). And while the construction of concepts through various component-abstractions is mutually intelligible (for instance, intuiting a centaur through the union of certain features of a horse and certain features of a human), it carries with it no necessity or non-conceptual "reality".
Thesis 2: "Knowledge" and metaphysics are incompatible.
2a. Metaphysics is absolute non-sense. (See 1g, 1i.)
"The essential thing about metaphysics: it obliterates the distinction between factual and conceptual investigations."
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. - Since Everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no use to us."
2b. Epistemically, the only incorrigible knowledge of "reality 7" that we have is of the here-and-now (i.e. immediate sense data, qualia).
"I want now to enlarge the point that the idea of 'foundations of knowledge' is a product of the choice of perceptual metaphors. To recapitulate, we can think of knowledge as a relation to propositions, and thus justification as a relation between the propositions in question and other propositions from which the former may be inferred. Or we may think of both knowledge and justification as privileged relations to the objects those propositions are about. If we think in the first way, we will see no need to end the potentially infinite regress of propositions-brought-forward-in-defense-of-other-propositions." —Rorty
2c. The ontological distinction between subject (-ivity) and object (-ivity) is untenable. The subject is at once an object, and the object is only experienced by means of the subject... the subject is at once itself and a feature of the world. It experiences the world by means of the world itself. (See the quote following 1f.)
2d. The mind-body distinction is purely the product of a language-game. It attempts, I suppose, to distinguish thinking from feeling, and internal states (i.e. subjectivity) from external states (objective reality), but the former is really a distinction between language and experience, and the latter is really between a subject's sense-experience and a mutual consensus (between persons) on sense-experience. Again, in metaphysical terms the mind/body distinction has no foundation—for we have no knowledge of this mutual consensus.
2e. Whatever the findings of the philosophy of mind, they will be of no practical or functional significance. There can be no a priori mutual consensus regarding internal states simply because there is no object or observable process.
Thesis 3: Certainty in the domain of philosophy is only possible insofar as it has no pertinence to the world.
3a. "Objectivity" in the domain of any given topic stands for little more than the possibility for universal agreement. This can only be achieved in a priori terms through prescription, and in a posteriori terms through the (accurate, scientific) description of the world. (The a priori sort can possess apodictic "objectivity", e.g. 1+1=2; the problem of induction prevents this in a posteriori cases.)
3b. Knowledge in practical terms (e.g. that there is gravity) isn't absolute, but it doesn't need to be in order to be of use. Mutual consensus is only beneficial insofar as it suits our practical interests. In this regard, we have no need for universal commensuration.
3c. It follows from philosophy's dependence on language that the only certainty it can proffer lies in matters that either have no pertinence to the world or that describe what is already known.
3d. Logic can inform us that, under certain rules and given certain rule-following components, one proposition will follow from another, but these rules cannot be constituted a priori without losing relevance to the world. Practical inquiries (ethics, social/political philosophy), conversely, can have relevance to the pre-existing ways we perceive and describe, but they are independent of certainty simply because philosophy is incapable of constructing a first principle that has a direct link to the world [as something independent of what is described].
3e. In this sense philosophy cannot say anything constructive. The above points illustrate the impossibility of system-building while maintaining relevance.
3f. Bertrand Russell once said:
"The point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it."While this may be a "traditional" conception of the footholds and aims of philosophical inquiries, it does not inform a philosophy that strives to be anything but impractical and esoteric.
Instead of having faith that our descriptions will transpose the world... instead of viewing "knowledge" as an ultimatum rather than a means to various ends, we should see philosophy for what it really is: the obvious or the dogmatic.
3g. Philosophy without certainty can, however, be productive in at least two areas: heuristics and hermeneutics. Heuristics embodies wisdom in the most conventional sense and hermeneutics represents an effort to deconstruct and interpret.
To this end, it is my hope that Russell's conception of philosophy is replaced by Wittgenstein's:
"Philosophy is not a theory but an activity."
1 All too often works in philosophy are strictly reactionary, and interdependent on other works for their (often unstated) presuppositions. Frequently, too, they're written in such esoteric terms that their significance to the world is limited to the few that can actually understand them. I've made an effort to avoid partaking in either tradition.
What follows is not intended to provide an absolute answer to philosophy as a study, but rather an attempt to frame it in such a way that it is robbed of its incongruities. It is an attempt at stating my current views to the best of my ability, and, in my mind, is free of controversy.
2 I've had some difficulty in finding an appropriate example to illustrate this. Let's suppose you are fixing something, thinking of ways to improve it, or identifying problems inherent in it. While language may assist you (as a heuristic device for instance), it is not necessary for you to carry on.
The idea that I'm trying to get across is that, when doing philosophy, language is not only removed from experience, but from other appropriate sources of reference (as in history, literature, mathematics). At this level the subject of inquiry becomes dubious.
3 This is a harsh way of saying that philosophical problems are completely artificial constructions. There may still be a "problem" so-to-speak, but it has no relevance to the world.
4 I admit that this quotation doesn't quite support my point, but I do feel it serves a purpose. As with all of the quotes, I am not trying to provide any interpretation of Wittgenstein, but rather show certain eloquent statements of his that are tied to my disposition.
5 This point is somewhat clumsy. Language can do a great variety of things, and it is in my opinion that these three encompass them, albeit if somewhat obscurely. The point is not to define three simple categories that neatly envelope all of its functions, but to give a basic idea of those functions.
6 A "picture" may tell you more about your frame of reference, but nothing further about what you are depicting.
7 The concept of "reality" is a troublesome. In practice, it describes a mutually perceived world (see 3a), but the idea that there is such a thing as "valid" and "invalid" experience doesn't make sense. Experiences are as they are, and short of some recourse to a higher being, we cannot say that one experience (experienced subjectively) is faulty while another is true.
Also, my use of the word "knowledge" shifts from meaning something like "absolute knowledge" to "corrigible" knowledge (e.g. experiences, available information, etc.) depending on the context of how it is used.
Labels:
best of blog,
editorial,
philosophy,
Wittgenstein
Wednesday, July 11, 2007
This world of ours 6


As Uganda is forced to outlaw plastic bags, a study has found that the world's wealthiest have increased their fortunes by 11.4% in 2006. But time spent earning money puts a strain on one's social life, and many simply don't have the time to keep up with friends on facebook or write in their blog— so they pay others to do it for them.
1. Why Uganda hates the plastic bag
2. World rich 'keep getting richer'
3. Are my online friends for real?
Despite the increasing wealth of the upper class, one man has decided that he no longer wishes to live in America's most expensive home ($165 million). He has stated that he wants a "lifestyle change."
4. 'Most expensive' US home on sale
Perhaps he wants to move to Vanuatu, which the Happy Planet Index has named the world's happiest country. Or if his lifestyle change is opting for more occupational stress, he could always become a librarian.
5. What's so great about living in Vanuatu?
6. Librarians 'suffer most stress'
Meanwhile, America is facing some problems. The dollar has reached a new low against the Euro and is continuing to fall, our health care system is terrible despite being the most expensive (it is ranked 37th, just above Slovenia), and one-third of Americans will abuse alcohol in the course of their lives.
7. Dollar falls to record euro low
8. Health-care costs are sickening
9. One-third of Americans abuse alcohol: survey
Further, the US Army fell well short of its recruiting goals. Hopefully this will improve in the coming decades it will likely take to resolve the insurgency. Don't bash Bush on the issue though, give his troop surge more time.
10. US Army falls short of recruiting goals again: officials
11. US Iraq chief warns of long war
12. Bush urges Congress Iraq support
13. Bush pleads for time to give Iraq plan chance to work
Don't feel alone if you do bash him though; 71% of Americans aren't fans of his administration. It's perfectly understandable—between the war, the egregious environmental and foreign policies, the president's favorable treatment of "Scooter" Libby, Cheney's assertion that he is not a part of the executive branch, and how the administration has consistently misled the American public and favored corporate interest, it does seem curious that almost a third of Americans actually approve of the guy. Maybe Putin will like him...?
14. Bush's popularity hits all time low
15. Bush not ruling out Libby pardon
16. Cheney claims a non-executive privilege
17. More Than Half of Americans Support Kucinich's Call to Impeach Cheney, Poll Shows
18. Bush woos Putin with home visit
Then again, I may just think all of that because the BBC has a liberal bias.
19. Does the BBC have a bias problem?
Wikipedia too. Apparently, after a home-school student turned in a history paper using "BCE" for dates, Andy Schlafly could no longer tolerate Wikipedia and created a more trustworthy alternative: Conservapedia.
20. A conservative's answer to Wikipedia
21. Conservapedia
Oh, how I adore thee, Lewis Black:
Murdoch's move [to buy the Wall Street Journal] is part of a trend by conservatives to turn what they see as left-leaning unfair biased media into right-leaning unfair biased media. When conservatives perceive institutions as liberal, they buy them. If they're not for sale, they make their own. Take Wikipedia, the online encyclopedia that is edited by you, the reader. Well, apparently conservatives feel that you have a liberal bias. So they've started Conservapedia, where homosexuality is defined not as "sexual attraction between people of the same gender..." as on Wikipedia, but as "...an immoral sexual lifestyle... going beyond the boundaries that God has set up..." I gotta tell ya, on Conservapedia "Gay" sounds way more interesting. Yep, free-market conservatives who don't like how the free market shook out on the internet aren't going to take it anymore. [...] So YouTube and Wikipedia, maybe the two most genuinely egalitarian media ever conceived, are a part of a vast left-wing conspiracy...
...
Despite its significant contributions to climate change, the US (California specifically) is leading the way in green technology. And as the world faces water shortage problems, the Sudanese government isn't living up to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement... and we're discovering that men and women are equally talkative.
22. US leads search for climate solutions
23. Water shortage 'a global problem'
24. Sudan misses withdrawal deadline
25. Men 'no less chatty than women'
...
A lot of news is disheartening...
26. CIA details Cold War skulduggery
27. US senator admits 'serious sin'
28. 'My mother held me down'
29. Vatican text angers Protestants
But then some news is inspirational.
30. Obama leads in campaign funding
It really depends on what you expose yourself to.
31. Western diet risk to Asian women
32. Organic food 'better' for heart
A cloud against the clouds
weaves and pushes its way past,
through the crowds,
and sees squares and stamps
dappling the ground below the glass.
In patches beneath its patch of shade
are fingers crawling, recording, reporting
the events of days
interacting and contorting.
Their only gaze is downward.
Labels:
best of blog,
environment,
news,
poetry,
politics,
this world of ours
Sunday, July 1, 2007
"Wittgenstein's speculative aesthetics"
I read this not long ago in Beyond Liberal Education: Essays in honor of Paul H. Hirst. It was, in my view, the best essay of the bunch... but it really had nothing to do with education. (Not until the last paragraph is anything even suggested about it, and then only minimally.)
Seeing that it was so out of place (if I was searching for such an essay it would be the last place I would've expected to find it) and not enough people read this blog for me to worry about any copyright issues, I figured I would post it.
Here it is:









Seeing that it was so out of place (if I was searching for such an essay it would be the last place I would've expected to find it) and not enough people read this blog for me to worry about any copyright issues, I figured I would post it.
Here it is:










Labels:
aesthetics,
best of blog,
philosophy,
Wittgenstein
Wednesday, June 27, 2007
Tuesday, June 19, 2007
:-(

1. Americans less happy today than 30 years ago: study
Americans are less happy today than they were 30 years ago thanks to longer working hours and a deterioration in the quality of their relationships with friends and neighbors, according to an Italian study.
"The main cause is a decline in the so-called social capital -- increased loneliness, increased perception of others as untrustworthy and unfair," said Stefano Bartolini, one of the authors of the study.
"Social contacts have worsened, people have less and less relationships among neighbors, relatives and friends."
By contrast, it appeared that based on the limited data available the happiness trend had remained largely stable in Europe, which had apparently avoided some of the changes in the American workplace like longer hours and more pressure.
i. Path to true happiness 'revealed'
ii. Dirt exposure 'boosts happiness'
iii. Happy planet index
Thursday, June 7, 2007
"America Votes 2008" (better title: The Right to Vote)

1. CNN Republican debate: Video streams and downloads
2. CNN Democratic debate: Video streams and downloads

What I would like to suggest is that informed and attentive votes are what we need to maintain a properly functioning democracy. Plato, in fact, ranked pure democracies as the second lowliest form of governance...and for good reason: if a society's actions are determined by people with little knowledge of what is at hand, the results are going to be far from ideal.1
However, to deny anyone the right to vote also flies in the face of democratic society. Accordingly, I feel that it is best to leave the right in tact while acknowledging social responsibility. In that sense, everyone can and should vote, but only if they've put in the time to have a fairly sophisticated grasp of the issues and what is at stake. It is an entirely voluntary measure: if you wish to vote, you have a social responsibility to educate yourself, but you should not have one without the other.
If this principle became the norm, the discourse of political campaigns would be vastly different. It would no longer focus on "swing voters" and sound bites, it would be a genuine cultural discussion of policy and credentials. No Swift Boat Vets, no deception... those participating in the elections would be the ones who have dedicated their time to researching everything at hand and in doing so have earned their right to vote.
Neither you nor I would want Paris Hilton to have any influence on any general election.
1Yep, I did say this before (albeit more elegantly):
I think Plato was correct in calling unmitigated democracy one of the lowliest forms of government (just above tyranny, in fact): while largely self-determining, it lacks virtue.
More:
i. Donkey voting
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)