"World 'warmest for 12,000 years'"

1. World 'warmest for 12,000 years'
2. Scientists: Earth temperature reaches dangerous level


And a brief retrospective:

i. BBC climate change experiment [also: study finds that Earth is hottest in 400 years]
ii. Three more articles about global warming
iii. This world of ours 1
iv. The heated debate over global warming
v. The heat of 2005

My problem with philosophy

For some time, I've had a sort of love-hate relationship with philosophy; I sometimes become curious and absorbed in certain distinctions and elucidations and sometimes feel that they are of no value at all. My philosophical appetite is very fickle I suppose. I think that this has been demonstrated to some small degree over the last few months of keeping this blog... for the sake of convenience, some posts on my understanding of philosophy are listed below in chronological order (though I'm not terribly proud of them, with the exception of the last):

i. The future of philosophy
ii. Journal Entry - The Philosophical Jigsaw Puzzle
iii. What's left of metaphysics
iv. phi‧los‧o‧phy |fəˈläsəfē|


There seems to be one very simple nagging and perhaps naive (though it doesn't seem incorrect) principle that is always in the back of my mind. This principle is that however elaborate, prolonged and intricate a philosophical system comes to be, in the end it's conclusions must be self-evident. (If this is not the case, the conclusion is a product of the sciences or dogmatism.) This is quite an impediment on the subject--how difficult it becomes for philosophy to identify something profound!

I've often thought that it would be infinitely valuable for some author to compile a list of the fundamental questions that remain within the domain of philosophy, so that, with the questions identified, they could be addressed in a more clearheaded and expedient fashion. The problem with this method is that the unanswered questions do not take the form of a particular "this or this?", but rather "what is this?". In this respect, philosophy does not adopt the role of clarifying dilemmas, but of defining (i.e. constructing) them... and I would contend, further, that these dilemmas are artificial, resulting from a disoriented or very definite use of language where the former would say something illusory and the latter would say something ultimately trivial.

An example of a "defining" dilemma would be like asking, "What is freedom?" or "What is law supposed to do?". The only true philosophical answer to these is to understand "freedom" or "law" out of their common usage and in a (new) narrow, technical sense. However, this is what spoils the process, because in that marginalization the solution to the "dilemma" proper is ignored in favor of a constricted and often pedantic exploration of concepts, distinctions, and logic. I started to first think about this a few years ago when I began doing Lincoln-Douglas debate in high-school, and it appeared to me that the key to succeeding in your position was to adjust the definitions as to expunge any sort of penumbral area (if I may borrow Hart's term for no apparent reason). But in doing this, the real question that is posed is ignored (a new question takes its place)... because that question (which is generally determined to be an even-ended pro-con dispute) has either an inherent misrelation of ideas or hopelessly ambivalent terminology therein which does more than obstruct a solution--it forbids one.

At present, I am confident that what I have explained above is accurate... I could continue it further for the sake of clarity or to "systematize" it in order to inject it with some academic credance, but I think I lack the enthusiasm to do so. I would very much appreciate ANY and ALL responses to what I have stated above... I desperately want my idea to be challenged, it could determine whether or not I continue to pursue philosophy as one of my 2-3 majors in college.

And to pre-empt a clever quip that I wouldn't doubt to hear, I am not saying that all philosophy can express nothing (therefore I am not presenting a philosophical inquiry in why philosophy is non-sense or anything to that effect), on the contrary I am asserting that philosophy can only proffer trivial conclusions and the arguments in this post are following in that tradition. In this sense, I believe philosophy (in a narrow sense) has the capacity to identify and correct artificial and superfluous problems created by philosophy (in a broad sense... including quasi-philosophical concepts that appear in language).

I'd really like some feedback on this. Am I mistaken?



10/15 update:

Further discussion on facebook (I'm not sure if the link will work... in any case you'll need to login to view it):

1. Fun with metaphilosophy

And a few excerpts to elaborate on my argument above:

Nonetheless, I'm not sure that my ideas came through quite as I had hoped (I get whimsical at times when writing for my own amusement, hence the "how...profound!" statement). I'm not expecting "poetry" from philosophy in any sense, nor am I necessarily desiring a direct and substantive practical application of the products of philosophy. The idea is that the appropriation of language toward generalized accounts (philosophy in a broad sense) creates fundamental inconsistencies which are to be solved by philosophy (in a narrow sense). In this view, philosophy is incapable of expressing anything _beyond_ that... it's basically the synthetic clarification of language. And it's in that respect that it lacks any "profound", non-banal, or non-trivial quality, as I see it.

And in the comparison to astrophysics, etc. I don't think those are acting in the same manner. Astrophysics formulates theories to try to explain the workings of our world (even if this isn't of "practical" value), it's a *science*, viz. something with which it's conclusions rest in empirical confirmation (or the lack of empirical dismissal). Philosophy has nothing of this character intrinsic to it--some branches will deal with empirical inputs as presuppositions, but nothing which fundamentally tells us the nature of things as they are, only the nature of language and logic (which I again argue are present due to inadvertant artificial constructions).

Where I'm getting bogged down is in my present conviction that philosophy doesn't say _anything_ illuminating. Even in practical cases like ethics I think that philosophy plays a fairly insignificant role. The presupposed axiological or aesthetic judgments are the foundations on which the logic and "philosophizing" follows; philosophy plays no role except explicating the contents of the presupposed value judgments or evaluative criteria which are incapable of being formulated _by_ philosophy. And in cases of competition or comparison between ethical systems, the discussion ultimately takes place on the grounds of value judgment, which are foreign to philosophy as a study.

(I generally take preference and value in philosophy as something different altogether--be it psychological or deontological. I usually just call it "philosophy in a broad sense" or "dogmatic" philosophy.)

I couldn't agree more about philosophy determining whether or not propositions are valid, but I don't think that that is just a metaphorical example--that's all that philosophy (in what I have called a 'narrow sense') can hope to do.

In my view, the only real "philosophy", so-called, is metaphilosophy (and I suppose a practical extension of this would be epistemology). If philosophy then proves that logic can pronounce something that is outside of itself then that field may be annexed to it... but to my understanding this has yet to come to fruition. To this end, philosophy says what we me may sensibly say and what we may not sensibly say, but nothing more.

With regard to philosophy's universal applicability, i.e. as the "science of possibility", I would still contend that this is in merely in the domain of logic. In the realm of imaginable 'universes', the only "abstracted" ones that I can intuit are those of math and geometry, and they too are functions of logic. Further, I'd argue that language functions to _characterize_ and _describe_ experience so it isn't as far-reaching as I believe you are suggesting.

As to the bits about metaphysics, I'm somewhat confused. Firstly, I'm uncertain as to how numbers can have any metaphysical alignment. How can operators or operands even be considered in the domain of metaphysics? Secondly, in the case of the cat and cat-with-one-hair missing, the complication is that you are biding into the problem of identity by ascribing an "objective" quality of singular immutable identity (i.e. object-ness) to it. That seems to be a pretty acute demonstration of what I'm talking about when I speak of artificial constructions created by language. And if you were to gradually progress to a hypothetical "nightmarish cat" that is without limbs, a tail, fur, and numerous other items that in all make it wholly alien to the normative conception of 'cat', I would then ask how this is not a dilemma created solely by the misappropriation of language and belonging to no other domain. In this example, experience is the case (the phenomena which you are referring to by the name 'cat'), not the way in which it is characterized.

[...]

But in all of this, I hope you can see why I have come to consider philosophy as mostly trivial. Philosophy has metaphilosophy, logic, and some consequent epistemology going for it... and that's about it. And, as I argued before, philosophy that follows from presupposition (e.g. ethics, jurisprudence, political philosophy, etc.) does nothing more than carry out the logical form and inclination of those presuppositions, so the philosophizing doesn't even play an active role...

What I meant was that language, in it's origins, development, and proper function, describes experience (i.e. a state of affairs such as "The sheet of paper is on the table" or "The sun is rising"). This state of affairs is empirical if the statement is to be regarded as "true" or if the inquiry is to be practical in the least. As to problems with metaphysics and causal necessity, identity, being, and so forth, they, again, are strictly "artificial" (I can think of no better way to describe it) problems resulting from the _misuse_ of language in relating "apposite" concepts (a good example of which would be Zeno of Elea's dichotomy paradox).

As to metaethics, I think it is coordinated properly under metaphilosophy and philosophy, but it is then quickly disposed of. The best statement of this that I can think of is the Dostoevskian (if that's actually an adjective) "How can there be crime if God does not exist?". The only real philosophical (i.e. metaethical) statement I believe one can claim of ethics is that it rests on ontological, deontological, or preferential presuppositions. And this statement is essentially an exercise in the philosophy of language that is guided by epistemology, such that it doesn't describe a state of affairs but instead describes "latent" meaning within terms of language to which there are no empirical states of affairs that properly correspond. Yet this still does not offer greater insight to the "way things are", it merely states, "By the word 'self' in this context (by so-and-so and in this syntax) it is meant..." In a sense this also requires presupposition--and it still does not properly correspond to the way things 'are', only the way that we describe them, and with many such terms oftentimes being inherently contradictory or misrelational _in_ meaning ('self' included, given the right context and supposed meaning).

And on another note, I've since decided to simply minor in philosophy. So my current inclination will be toward two majors and two minors: majors in drawing/painting and sociology, and minors in art history and philosophy. We'll see how this holds up.

Hapless poetry 10

Poetry is
an expression of the tongue.
and soul.

a vividly unconstrained
river of ideas weaned by
a lingual aesthetic

a contiguous strand of
thought of beauty of sorrow
of insight of life of death that
is uninhibited by conventions
a comma is nothing but a premeditated breath
a lapse in a moment to accentuate ideas before lines are overgrown
and run off the pa...

Poetry and essay are not selfsame
Poetry cannot be

forwarded by a single declarative statement
that lacks association,
the color the touch the smell the sound, the intuition
of a dialogue that is composed for a different purpose
than to be heard, to be understood

when the conventions are stripped
bare, what remains?

the Poem that this ceases to be;
Only.
an essay with horrid structure.
poor conventions.

Value and the function of the state

I thought it would be an interesting exercise to try to conceive an "ideal" normative framework for a political system (according to my perspective). This post is my initial start on this project. It's maybe 1/8 of the way done, although I couldn't say for sure until I finish. There's a lot of things to clean up and even more to add. I'd just like to invite criticism every step along the way.


1 Within the normative framework of a capitalist state, discrepancies between matters of value occur in either of two sorts of things:
(1) The role and function of the state
(2) The "balancing acts" between established values

1.1 Fundamentally, the function of the state is to promote the welfare and well-being of its citizens. (This paradigm may, however, prove insufficient for interaction between states, but this will be addressed later.)

1.11 This is self-evident. A state that does not promote welfare (neither actively nor passively) is not only undesirable but superfluous.

1.12 All values that are to be reflected in the state are done so under the umbrella of welfare. Among these are liberty, order, justice, health, equality, democracy, etc.

1.13 This appears true regardless of one's political leaning; any disagreement that is bound to arise on this matter lies in the means and extent that the state should pursue to promote these, and in an inherently imprecise "balancing act" between the tenets of welfare (e.g. when in a certain conflict, liberty takes precedence over order).

1.131 The assigning of precedence between tenets need not be hierarchical.

2 In addition, the state may be seen as a formal extension of culture and society.

2.1 This poses the question of whether the social and political spheres should be separate or unified.

2.12 The social sphere can exist and function without becoming entwined in the political sphere.

2.121 Social standards can be upheld without the recourse of law, i.e. informally. (This practice is formally justified provided that the means utilized does not conflict with existing law.)

2.122 If an informal standard requires the recourse of law in order to be upheld, it must be synonymous with the formal. If this is not the case the formal standard would take precedence over the informal.

2.13 The political sphere cannot exist and function without becoming entwined in the social sphere.

2.131 The political sphere exists to regulate the social sphere.

2.132 The actors that comprise the political sphere are not independent of the social sphere.

2.2 The social sphere is intrinsically heterogeneous.

2.21 Therewith modes of ethics in the social sphere will inevitably clash.

2.211 Ethics necessarily requires presupposition (the prescription of value).

2.212 This presupposition is either worldly (viz. sensory-psychological, e.g. preference utilitarianism) or non-worldly (i.e. theological).

2.22 The formal dilemma lies in constructing a homogenous framework that allows for heterogeneity, while at the same time minimizing conflict within the formal domain.

2.3 Therefore, a compromise may be necessary, i.e. limiting factors, if heterogeneity is to be permitted.

2.31 Any compromise would require an arbiter, a "third" party. This arbiter may be a combination of objective sciences (i.e. science and philosophy in a narrow sense).

2.32 Science and philosophy can express objective validity. Social custom can only express objective validity if confirmed by science and philosophy.

2.33 By 'objective', I mean practical by virtue of worldly observation.

2.4 Social customs that lack objective validity should not be expressed formally, i.e. through law.

2.41 Non-worldly, i.e. noumenal, justifications are incapable of expressing objective validity. (Things that are outside of the world cannot be proven by means of the world.)

2.42 Justifications expressing objective validity apply to all sects of the social sphere.

2.421 Objectivity supplants dogmatism when in conflict. (That which is objective exists in the world and is proven by means of the world) [Also: natural law intrinsically takes precedence over human law.] In this case, objectivity--that which must be proven by means of the world--should be distinguished from dogmatism--that which must be proven by means of social custom or factors outside of the world.

2.422 If cultural heterogeneity is not to be formally subdued, the formal framework should not side with any cultural sect lest the state becomes a formal extension of that sect.

2.43 Therefore, social customs with non-worldly justification should not be expressed formally unless they also possess objective justification, and then only on the merit of the latter. Likewise, social customs that do not express objective validity should not be formally restricted unless they conflict with existing law.

2.431 The popular demand for formally expressed dogmatism does not itself constitute objective validity.

2.6 Therefore, the state (which is formal) should only function as an extension of culture insofar as it expresses the objective views of the (cultural) body that comprises it. Culture proper is to be expressed informally; it is the duty of the state to facilitate that expression within its formal framework.

2.7 The expression of objective validity is not wholly sufficient in determining the grounds for law--the baseline moral foundations are incapable of having objective determinacy.

2.71 These axiological "gaps" are sated by presupposition. The necessary moral foundations are found in the presupposition of the purpose of the state, i.e. welfare of the body it governs.

2.8 The formal ethics of a state that allows for cultural heterogeneity must appeal to either relativism or universality, or both.

2.81 Relativism is permitted through the lack of formal interference on informal practices. This is established passively, i.e. through laws granting negative liberties.

2.82 At the same time, no legal morality would be established under strict passivity. (A strictly relativistic ethical system ceases to be ethical.) Therefore, some code of universality is required on the part of the state--this is unavoidable.

3 Laws are formal propositions that collectively regulate the actions of the state and its citizens for a collective benefit.

3.1 Laws are moral in nature.

3.11 Just as the function of the state is to establish and promote welfare, so too is the function of law.

3.12 There is no such thing as a law that altogether lacks any form of moral objective. (Or, more accurately, laws that altogether lack a moral objective are undesirable and unnecessary.)

3.121 "Morally neutral" laws are components of formal schemata which collectively form cohesive, morally or objectively oriented laws.

3.122 A law can be comprised of separate components or procedural mandates which are themselves considered laws. These components, when viewed in a larger context, constitute a larger law that is not morally neutral.

3.1221 Contract law is no exception. The fields required of formal contracts are adopted for practical and moral reasons.

3.123 The descending hierarchy of law's formulation could be seen as moral -> moral application -> procedure.

3.1231 (e.g. Murder is immoral -> murder is therefore illegal -> recourse in the case of murder follows from these formal procedural requirements and leads to this formal procedural persecution.)

3.124 These sub-moral, "procedural" laws are inherently more corrigible than morals and moral applications.

3.2 The foremost moral-law would establish the system of law, the framework in which law operates.

To be continued...

Three more articles about global warming

1. Humans 'causing stronger storms'
2. Earth's species feel the squeeze
3. In pictures: Your changing world

Hapless poetry 9

Breathing that same recycled air,
Stiffly shifting... coalescing in neither
Hymn nor drone--

Neither flake nor stone
Shall fly from this enclave--
Neither softly grating, softly canvasing,
Neither flitting despondently
In concert from hem nor bone.

Neither erased; neither falling--
Suddenly shaped, enveloping
Garret eyes--wide and callow,

Softly stratifying, gently preening
Sanguine hallows, discarded shadows--
Neither weaning--

Neither shaking, nor trembling:
A carousel, like hands in a stream.

A weaving, interleaving mesh--
Foreign. Like the arms of a dream
Caressing oppressively.

Farewell Steve Irwin...

1. 'Crocodile Hunter' Irwin killed
2. Time: Death of a Crocodile Hunter
3. Death only 4th of its type
4. In pictures: Steve Irwin