Not long ago I put up a simple post arguing that all ethical judgment is formulated upon a priori value tenets (e.g. human happiness is the greatest good) that are presupposed. Without such there is no ground for ethical evaluation. And (to elaborate) because there is no truth in ethics without knowledge of God, and the knowledge of God is a noumenal matter, there is no absolute ethical system available to us. Consequently, presupposition is necessary in ethics.
i. Ethics presupposes deontology
The very nature of ethics (excluding the strictly relativistic) is inclined toward universalization. For example, if cannibalism is wrong, how can it not be willed that others should not be cannibals? In this sense, ethical subjectivity (with proper conviction) strives to become universalized.
In Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov, the elder Zosima had a very memorable remark: "[H]ow can there be crime if God does not exist?" This is a key dilemma to be overcome by ethical systems if they are to succeed in extending beyond subjectivity. In the search for a comprehensive and universally applicable (i.e. "ideal") ethical framework, the uncertainty of God's existence is important as it makes the framework, objectively understood, atheistic. So, again, "how can there be crime if God does not exist?"
Utilitarians would argue that happiness is the most evident a priori tenet and I wouldn't be inclined to disagree with them. Peter Singer, for instance, takes our innate sensory (and psychological) faculties and transcribes them into good and evil. In an oversimplified sense, that which causes more pleasure than pain is good, and that which causes more pain than pleasure is bad (i.e. evil). Two problems that arise from this are the means to the Good and the feasibility of calculation, which I believe are relatively minor concerns that I will not argue here.
A third problem, and what I think to be the most important, is due to the interference of the will and the tendency of most ethical systems to strive for universalization in their own right. The will, comprised of ontological and teleological convictions (tenets), prevents axiological judgment (the determination of tenets) from becoming properly resolvable. I don't find this to be something that necessarily needs to be overcome, on the contrary I believe it is why universalized ethics cannot be a science. The arising problem is thus:
In my mind, there are two possible paths to take from this:
7/21 update:
I've thought about this off and on for a while and it would be best to disregard the two options at the end. The second "path" is illusory and almost rhetorical; what I have illustrated is the paradox of ethical systems, not their potential direction. Ethics is, after all, a purely subjective value (preference) judgment, so it is nonsensical to think that a system of ethics could ever usurp relativism or be adequate to function universally.
i. Ethics presupposes deontology
The very nature of ethics (excluding the strictly relativistic) is inclined toward universalization. For example, if cannibalism is wrong, how can it not be willed that others should not be cannibals? In this sense, ethical subjectivity (with proper conviction) strives to become universalized.
In Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov, the elder Zosima had a very memorable remark: "[H]ow can there be crime if God does not exist?" This is a key dilemma to be overcome by ethical systems if they are to succeed in extending beyond subjectivity. In the search for a comprehensive and universally applicable (i.e. "ideal") ethical framework, the uncertainty of God's existence is important as it makes the framework, objectively understood, atheistic. So, again, "how can there be crime if God does not exist?"
Utilitarians would argue that happiness is the most evident a priori tenet and I wouldn't be inclined to disagree with them. Peter Singer, for instance, takes our innate sensory (and psychological) faculties and transcribes them into good and evil. In an oversimplified sense, that which causes more pleasure than pain is good, and that which causes more pain than pleasure is bad (i.e. evil). Two problems that arise from this are the means to the Good and the feasibility of calculation, which I believe are relatively minor concerns that I will not argue here.
A third problem, and what I think to be the most important, is due to the interference of the will and the tendency of most ethical systems to strive for universalization in their own right. The will, comprised of ontological and teleological convictions (tenets), prevents axiological judgment (the determination of tenets) from becoming properly resolvable. I don't find this to be something that necessarily needs to be overcome, on the contrary I believe it is why universalized ethics cannot be a science. The arising problem is thus:
- Ethics cannot be a science.
- Non-relativistic modes of ethics seek to become universalized.
- A strictly relativistic mode of ethics ceases to be ethical.
In my mind, there are two possible paths to take from this:
- So be it. Ethics will continue the way that it has progressed. There will always be ethical conflict and globalization will never lead to any ethical universality.
- How do we incorporate relativism and subjectivism into ethics without contradiction?
7/21 update:
I've thought about this off and on for a while and it would be best to disregard the two options at the end. The second "path" is illusory and almost rhetorical; what I have illustrated is the paradox of ethical systems, not their potential direction. Ethics is, after all, a purely subjective value (preference) judgment, so it is nonsensical to think that a system of ethics could ever usurp relativism or be adequate to function universally.
No comments:
Post a Comment