To the tune of a summary: for Kierkegaard, existence-spheres are modes of living. (I'll admit my knowledge of his writings are by no means comprehensive, if you notice any error please correct me.) There a three spheres:
The ethical sphere is the next step up: instead of the individual being interested in the benefaction of the self, the individual is interested in the benefaction of the universal. In Either/Or (Enten-Eller), Kierkegaard explains the difference between the aesthetic and ethical existence-spheres as roughly whether one accepts good and evil or excludes them. The act of exclusion is the aesthetic, the other is the ethical.
The third is the religious. As an agnostic, I find myself omitting or aggregating this in my personal, informal considerations. It seems intuitive that this would be present in the ethical sphere, but Kierkegaard argues against this, primarily with the story of Abraham and Isaac (Abraham murdering Isaac would be unethical, but proper in the religious realm according to SK*). As one could infer, this leads to the individual not being interested in the self or the universal, but infinitely interested in the absolute (viz. God).
*I disagree with this somewhat. (This premise is from Fear and Trembling, I haven't read Stages on Life's Way yet.) If the ethical is determined subjectively and in living for the universal one considers divine decree to be veiled in the highest good, then this example's action would be ethical. The case where this would not be is when the ethical is construed as an aggregate rather than a subjective. I'd contend that subjectivity is the domain of ethics, so even if I consider myself to be moral in a world absolutely composed of others that wouldn't consider me to be moral, I am moral to me.
What I am presently pondering are the gray areas between these. Although these may occur by means of "qualitative leaps", I would consider it almost improbable for one to live solely in the domain of one of these existence-spheres, especially in idle moments. (I realize I am examining this naive issue on naive terms. The act of writing this on my part despite it not serving any scholarly or beneficial end is to deal with idleness, at this moment I am not acting in the ethico-religious mode.) One who devotes their every waking breath and thought to the benefaction of others is nearly inconceivable to me. Does one who has devoted their existence to God never take the time to engage in aesthetic self-interest? Does one devoted to the universal, ever rest when he or she could be doing more to help everyone else?
This discussion is a dead end. I thought that the premise sounded somewhat intriguing, but as I understand it, the act of being in any given sphere is that when it conflicts with another, the given existence-sphere is given precedence. In an ascending fashion (i.e. aesthetic-ethical-religious), this is because one thinks the others are nonsensical. For an esthete, precedence for the ethical or religious would be irrelevant and may think to his or her self, "Good and evil? There are no universals in good and evil-- they are formulated by the individual thinker. God? How can I know anything about God?" In a descending fashion, a religious person would find their inherent obligation to have higher priority. He or she would think, "Why do ___ when the universal doesn't will that I should. Why do ___ when God itself doesn't will it."
Turning out of this cul-de-sac and going elsewhere, is consideration of good and evil necessarily neglected in the aesthetic existence-sphere? Surely, an esthete would make the interesting out to be the good, and develop value criteria from there. I can't think of any objection to this, and for that reason I think the aesthetic sphere should be characterized by strict interest in subjectivity, possibility, and the self, not "good and evil". All three spheres rely on the distinction between good and evil, but the appropriation and position of the subject varies.
To deny good and evil altogether? (Even in the existing subject.) Is that aesthetic? A pure skeptic I don't think would snuggly be positioned in any of these aforementioned Kierkegaardian modes of living. Maybe it's ethical? Maybe it's interest in the universal when the universal (in a non-aggregate sense) has no substance. Maybe it's the religious if the absolute has no substance? Maybe it's possible.
- The aesthetic
- The ethical
- The religious
The ethical sphere is the next step up: instead of the individual being interested in the benefaction of the self, the individual is interested in the benefaction of the universal. In Either/Or (Enten-Eller), Kierkegaard explains the difference between the aesthetic and ethical existence-spheres as roughly whether one accepts good and evil or excludes them. The act of exclusion is the aesthetic, the other is the ethical.
The third is the religious. As an agnostic, I find myself omitting or aggregating this in my personal, informal considerations. It seems intuitive that this would be present in the ethical sphere, but Kierkegaard argues against this, primarily with the story of Abraham and Isaac (Abraham murdering Isaac would be unethical, but proper in the religious realm according to SK*). As one could infer, this leads to the individual not being interested in the self or the universal, but infinitely interested in the absolute (viz. God).
*I disagree with this somewhat. (This premise is from Fear and Trembling, I haven't read Stages on Life's Way yet.) If the ethical is determined subjectively and in living for the universal one considers divine decree to be veiled in the highest good, then this example's action would be ethical. The case where this would not be is when the ethical is construed as an aggregate rather than a subjective. I'd contend that subjectivity is the domain of ethics, so even if I consider myself to be moral in a world absolutely composed of others that wouldn't consider me to be moral, I am moral to me.
What I am presently pondering are the gray areas between these. Although these may occur by means of "qualitative leaps", I would consider it almost improbable for one to live solely in the domain of one of these existence-spheres, especially in idle moments. (I realize I am examining this naive issue on naive terms. The act of writing this on my part despite it not serving any scholarly or beneficial end is to deal with idleness, at this moment I am not acting in the ethico-religious mode.) One who devotes their every waking breath and thought to the benefaction of others is nearly inconceivable to me. Does one who has devoted their existence to God never take the time to engage in aesthetic self-interest? Does one devoted to the universal, ever rest when he or she could be doing more to help everyone else?
This discussion is a dead end. I thought that the premise sounded somewhat intriguing, but as I understand it, the act of being in any given sphere is that when it conflicts with another, the given existence-sphere is given precedence. In an ascending fashion (i.e. aesthetic-ethical-religious), this is because one thinks the others are nonsensical. For an esthete, precedence for the ethical or religious would be irrelevant and may think to his or her self, "Good and evil? There are no universals in good and evil-- they are formulated by the individual thinker. God? How can I know anything about God?" In a descending fashion, a religious person would find their inherent obligation to have higher priority. He or she would think, "Why do ___ when the universal doesn't will that I should. Why do ___ when God itself doesn't will it."
Turning out of this cul-de-sac and going elsewhere, is consideration of good and evil necessarily neglected in the aesthetic existence-sphere? Surely, an esthete would make the interesting out to be the good, and develop value criteria from there. I can't think of any objection to this, and for that reason I think the aesthetic sphere should be characterized by strict interest in subjectivity, possibility, and the self, not "good and evil". All three spheres rely on the distinction between good and evil, but the appropriation and position of the subject varies.
To deny good and evil altogether? (Even in the existing subject.) Is that aesthetic? A pure skeptic I don't think would snuggly be positioned in any of these aforementioned Kierkegaardian modes of living. Maybe it's ethical? Maybe it's interest in the universal when the universal (in a non-aggregate sense) has no substance. Maybe it's the religious if the absolute has no substance? Maybe it's possible.
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