Monday, March 14, 2011

Thoughts on casual philosophy

Lately I've been reading The Gutenberg Elegies, and as I've been reading I've been having an odd reaction. I've found myself dismissing the denser, more philosophical parts as purely anecdotal—as though they lacked the legitimacy and insight of more erudite, specialized philosophical writings. It's not so much that the things that Birkerts is saying don't fit in with my conceptual schema (although they sometimes don't), but that I see his remarks as fanciful rather than disciplined. And this interpretation of mine bothers me.

There is certainly a problem with the gulf between literature and "purebred" philosophy. The former can often gravitate towards over-sentimentality, the latter, conversely, can be all but inaccessible to a general audience--or, worse, skirt on irrelevance. I've written elsewhere that I'm not fond of the view that philosophy is a collaborative project akin to modern science, as in the analytic tradition--so I'm in no way suggesting that philosophy is not the business of non-professionals. In fact, since high school I've prided myself in being something of a generalist; I'd like to see more Sam Hamiltons, not less, not overly specialized experts who occupy a very narrow view of the world, more like shards than finished sculptures.

In Birkerts' book, I seem to detect an overreach for sentimentality. I see this elsewhere frequently when people privilege certain musings for their entertainment or anecdotal value rather than didactic value or their coherence to interrelated ideas. (This seems especially common in vague, New Age quasi-spirituality.) At some level this tact also tries to bask in an easily interchangeable, interrelatable model of human communication and human nature that, in my view, just isn't there. It presumes too much; that dressed up prose can overcome the space between people, the worlds of difference between how they understand the same world. Certainly any human communication attempts that, but generality begets generality. And as much as I romanticize the generalist, I don't think they can really function without intense, concerted specificity. A generalist must extend an invitation to the reader but also stake his/her ground.

And in the process I think it may be best to occlude or abandon the general, inclusive "we." I have no problem with systematizing as long as it is attached to an individual's life-history or their intellectual history. Otherwise, I think it ought to be situated in terms of other thought, like professional philosophers would have it. My problem, as I see it now, is that I have trouble taking seriously anything in-between or outside of these.

(Another thought: literature is more in the habit of raising thoughts and concerns than finishing them. When something outside of philosophy attempts to finish something, flags go up--more than usual. Although I don't think philosophy ought to be in the business of "finishing" thoughts either, that's its shtick; I guess it's what I've come to expect.)

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